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Abstract
This paper examines an equity portfolio comprised of publicly traded firms that serve as the
primary sponsor of a NASCAR race team to determine whether such a “specialty fund”
could diversify risk as effectively as a more carefully chosen portfolio. We calculate risk
adjusted return measures and find that the NASCAR portfolio consistently outperforms
market benchmarks. We also find that over longer time periods (greater than three years)
the constructed portfolio exhibits lower risk than a market benchmark. We contend that
NASCAR sponsorship may serve as a signal to the market of a firm’s financial health.
I.

Introduction

While investors develop portfolios with a few primary objectives in mind (namely to
reduce unsystematic risk and/or to enhance portfolio returns) there are often underlying
objectives of secondary importance. As an example, socially responsible funds attract
investors who seek to align their personal investment strategies with their religious, social, or
political beliefs. The funds have become extremely popular since the first such fund was
introduced in 1971. In addition, there are many other “specialty” funds that invest solely in
sectors, such as multimedia, energy, financial, healthcare, leisure industry, life science, etc.
In this paper we developed a specialty fund comprised only of firms that serve as a
primary sponsor for cars in the top racing series of the National Association of Stock Car
Racing (NASCAR), what is now known as the Sprint Cup Series. NASCAR popularity has
skyrocketed in recent years and the sport enjoys tremendous fan support and loyalty. We
compare the risk-adjusted return performance of this portfolio with that of more established
benchmarks. This paper has broad importance and practical significance in that investors
may be better able to earn higher risk-adjusted returns by including this specialty fund in
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their asset allocation strategy. This paper will also provide insight into whether targeted
diversification (by investing in a range of firms that have some common denominator) can be
effective in reducing portfolio risk.
Over the last several years NASCAR sanctioned auto racing has become one of the
most popular spectator sports in the United States. This is particularly true of race events at
the body’s top level, Sprint (formerly Winston, formerly Nextel) Cup. NASCAR is a
sponsor-driven sport with the cars, drivers, and crew adorned with the colors and logos of a
number of sponsors. Fortune Magazine reported that for 2004, NASCAR had sponsorship
revenue of $1.5 billion, more than the National Football League and Major League Baseball
combined (O’Keefe, 2005). In addition to monetary investment by the automobile
companies, sponsors are drawn from a wide range of products including alcohol (Budweiser,
Miller Lite and Coors Lite are long-time sponsors), home and consumer products (Tide,
M&M’s, Office Depot) as well as building supplies (Home Depot, Lowe’s and DeWalt).
This paper seeks to answer three portfolio related questions using financial data from
firms who sponsor NASCAR race cars. First, is it possible to build a simple investment
portfolio of publicly traded companies who invest in sponsoring NASCAR race cars and
outperform established benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis? Second, is it possible for the
NASCAR portfolio to diversify risk as effectively as a more broad selection of stocks?
Finally, does full vs. partial sponsorship lead to differences in excess returns? We hope to
use the answers to these three questions to provide insight into whether sponsorship serves as
a signal for strong companies.
II.

Sponsorship Basics

There are many ways for a company to be involved in NASCAR racing. In this paper
we focus on those companies who have chosen to be the primary sponsor of a race car at
some point during a NASCAR Sprint Cup racing season. An online article posted on Jeff
Gordon’s official website provides a user friendly overview of sponsorship (Jeff Gordon
online, 2005). The cost for the primary sponsor position on a car, which provides space on
both rear quarter panels of the car, hood, team transporter, and team uniforms, ranges
between $8 million and $21 million per year. Primary sponsors also typically pay for
signage at the track as well as hospitality and other related costs, some of which may double
sponsor financial involvement (O’Keefe et al. 2005).
Even at these costs, firms are eager to contribute. Part of this can be attributed to the
unique role sponsors have in racing. Unlike most televised sports where sponsor messages
are secondary to the telecast of the event, the telecast of the race provides air time for the
sponsors. Each time a car is shown on television the sponsors receive on-air exposure. One
return on a sponsor’s investment is this “free” television exposure. Joyce Julius and
Associates, Inc. estimated that Lowe’s received nearly $20 million of in-broadcast exposure
during the 2006 Daytona 500 won by Jimmie Johnson, who drives the car sponsored by
Lowe’s (Joyce Julius and Associates, Inc., 2006). An estimated $11.6 million of this came
from the display of the primary sponsor logo on the hood of the car. On average, primary
sponsors received $1.4 million in television broadcast race exposure for each of the 36 races
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in the 2005 season. Additionally, merchandise sold to the fans typically also includes the
sponsor’s name and colors as part of the merchandise.
Market research has also shown that NASCAR fans are quite loyal to the brands that
sponsor their favorite driver. Prior to their entry into NASCAR sponsorship, Office Depot
found that “forty four percent of NASCAR fans who shopped at a competitor would switch
to Office Depot” as a result of their sponsorship of a car (Daniel, 2006). O’Keefe et al.
reported that Home Depot saw a double-digit increase in ladder sales after offering a 10%
discount to anyone who brought in an ad featuring Tony Stewart climbing the fence at the
Daytona Motor Speedway after a July 2005 victory at the track. (The ad copy read “Hey
Tony, we have ladders”).
That advertising dollars translate into economic benefits for firm shareholders is well
documented. Reilly, McGann, and Marquardt find a positive relationship between substantial
advertising expenditures and the relative wealth position of the firm’s owners (Reilly,
McGann, and Marquardt, 1977). Schonfeld and Boyd report that corporate advertising has a
positive and statistically significant effect on stock prices (Schonfeld and Boyd, 1982). They
find that it is advertising that affects stock prices, not vice versa. Further, their results are
robust and are consistent over two different time periods.
Ben-Zion used a regression framework to highlight the effect of advertising dollars on
returns to shareholders (Ben-Zion, 1978). He regressed advertising and promotions dollars on
current stock price. He concluded that the estimated coefficient represents the present value
of future cash inflows attributed to this period’s advertising and promotion dollars. Erickson
and Jacobson propose an information asymmetry argument (Erickson and Jacobson, 1992).
They suggest that increases in a firm’s advertising and promotions budget may send a
positive signal to the market that the firm has discretionary cash flows available for such
expenditures.
Other studies have employed an event student methodology to document capital
market reactions that result from specific marking events such as slogan changes, brand
introductions, and celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995)(Conchar, Kinkhan,
and Bodkin 2003)(Kim and Morris 2003)(Mathur and Mathur 1995, 1996, 2000)(Mathur,
Mathur, and Rangan 1997)(Lane and Jacobson 1995). These and other studies document the
positive relationship that exists between levels of adverting and promotional spending and
the market value of the firm. Marketing activities (specifically advertising and promotions
spending) are generally expected to deliver future positive cash flows and result in increases
in shareholder wealth.
III.

Methodology and Data

To carry out this analysis we examine several equally-weighted portfolios consisting
of equity from all publicly traded firms who sponsored cars at the Sprint Cup level of
NASCAR in the years 2000-2005, regardless of the level or amount of sponsorship. (During
the time period under consideration the Sprint Cup Series was known as the Winston Cup
Series). The investment strategy in each portfolio is to purchase and hold equity in the firms
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who are the primary sponsor in at least one race during the purchase year. Our analysis
consists of six, five, four, three, two, and one-year holding periods. For multi-year holding
periods the portfolios were re-balanced each year (by dropping and adding firms) to include
only those firms active in sponsorship for the new season. Thus, the two year holding period
(2004-2005) includes all of the firms active in sponsorship for the 2004 season, and all of the
firms active in sponsorship for the 2005 season. Specifically, if a firm was active in
sponsorship for both years, then its return was used in the calculation of the portfolio return
for both years. If a firm sponsored races in 2004 but did not continue to do so in 2005, then
the firm’s return was used to calculate the portfolio return for 2004 only. If the firm did not
sponsor races in 2004 but did so in 2005, then its return was used to calculate the portfolio
return for 2005 only. In most cases, firms continue to sponsor cars year after year. However,
our portfolio construction ensures that firms who drop out of sponsorship are not erroneously
included in risk and return measures for multi-year holding periods. For each portfolio, we
calculate risk-adjusted return measures. We will examine the monthly returns of holding this
portfolio from purchase on the first trading day of the month until the last trading day of the
month. The risk and annualized return results of these portfolios are compared to results
from larger equity index measures. We ignore transactions costs in the computation of rates
of return.
The data consist of stock price data collected for all of the publicly traded companies
which served as the primary sponsor of a NASCAR Sprint Cup car during the period 20002005. The data on NASCAR sponsorship details on a race-by-race basis was taken from race
information at www.racing-reference.info. Returns were calculated using the adjusted share
prices for a given company. The historical prices used were the monthly adjusted closing
prices provided by Commodity Systems Inc. and reported by finance.yahoo.com, which
represented the closing price for a particular company on the last day of every month,
specifically adjusted for dividends and splits.
IV.

Results

Monthly returns were calculated for each firm that sponsored at least one car (for any
number of races) during the racing season. The number of firms comprising the sample for
each period of observation are reported in Table 1.
For each period, the compound annual return was calculated, as well as the portfolio
standard deviation and beta. Summary statistics may be found in Table 2.
The results indicate that the NASCAR portfolio consistently earned higher returns
than the S&P 500. Additionally for the two longest holding periods, the NASCAR portfolio
had a lower standard deviation than did the S&P 500. For shorter periods, the S&P 500 had a
much lower standard deviation. Additionally portfolio beta suggests that for longer holding
periods the NASCAR portfolio is less volatile than the market. It is reasonable that a small
sample of firms would be more volatile in the short run than a larger market basket. There
was a statistically significant difference in the returns between the portfolio for both the
2000-2005 period and the 2001-2005 period regardless of how standard deviations were
calculated. When the monthly standard deviations were annualized the 2002-2005 and the
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2003-2005 periods also saw a statistically significant difference between the NASCAR
portfolio and the S&P 500. It is not surprising that t-statistics became smaller the shorter the
time period under consideration.
To assess the risk-adjusted performance of the two portfolios three widely-recognized
measures were calculated. They include the Sharpe ratio, Treynor measure, and alpha
(Sharpe, 1966)(Treynor, 1965)(Jensen, 1969). Investors and financial advisors find these
tools to be useful when ranking portfolios in terms of their risk-adjusted performance.
The Sharpe measure is the ratio of excess portfolio return divided by the portfolio
standard deviation. It is a relative measure of risk-adjusted performance:
(1)
In this measure, Rp is the return from our NASCAR portfolio while Rf represents the risk-free
rate of return. We use the return on a 90-day Treasury bill as our measure of risk-free returns.
The σp in the denominator is the standard deviation of the NASCAR portfolio.
The Treynor measure is also a relative measure of risk-adjusted performance. The
numerator is identical to that of the Sharpe ratio, that is, portfolio return in excess of the riskfree rate of return. The denominator, however, is the portfolio beta coefficient:
(2)
The difference in the two performance measures, therefore, is that the Sharpe ratio adjusts for
total risk (measured by standard deviation) while the Treynor measure adjusts for market risk
only (measured by beta).
Jensen’s alpha is an absolute measure of risk-adjusted performance. Alpha is
estimated through a regression of excess portfolio return on excess market returns:
(3)
where ERpt is the excess portfolio return (this is the return on the portfolio in month t minus
the risk-free rate during month t); βp is the portfolio beta, ERmt is the excess return on the
market portfolio during month t, εpt is the residual term during month t, and αp is the riskadjusted excess return earned over the time period.
Following Reilly and Norton, we also computed another performance measurement
tool that is a variation of the traditional Sharpe ratio (Reilly and Norton, 2003). The New
Sharpe ratio examines the differential returns of a portfolio against its benchmark.
(4)
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where Rpt is the portfolio return in month t, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio during
month t, and σD is the standard deviation of the differential return over the time period. Like
Jensen’s alpha, this is an absolute measure of risk-adjusted performance. This measure
allows for direct comparison against a benchmark portfolio. They differ, however, in that
Jensen’s alpha adjusts for systematic risk while the new Sharpe ratio adjusts for total risk.
Table 3 reports the risk-adjusted performance measures for the six periods observed.
Both of our relative measures indicate that the NASCAR portfolio outperformed our
market benchmark in all six periods of analysis. Our absolute measures of performance also
indicate that on a risk adjusted excess return basis the NASCAR portfolio typically
outperforms the market portfolio. It should be noted that for the three shortest portfolio
periods Jensen’s Alpha was not statistically different from zero.
Over the time period of our analysis some firms (such as Budweiser) consistently
sponsored a car. Others engaged in a partial sponsorship plan in which they shared the
primary sponsor role with other companies. Office Depot’s previously mentioned
sponsorship of Carl Edwards would be an example. In addition, some firms made very brief
appearances sponsoring cars on a very infrequent, inconsistent basis. We would like to know
whether excess returns to sponsoring firms are related to the decision to sponsor a car at all,
or whether full season sponsorship is required to see excess returns. To facilitate the
comparison, the following regression was estimated on the periods of observation:
(5)
where
R*t =
Dst =

the stacked vector of company excess returns (return in excess of the risk-free rate)
shift dummy variable that takes on a value of 0 if the firm sponsored all races, 1 if the
firm sponsored less than 100% of the races
Rmt = excess market returns (market return minus the risk-free rate)
α* = the shift in the estimate of excess returns due to the firm sponsoring less than all of
the races
*
β = a measure of the firm’s systematic risk
Yeari = a dummy variable for the year i where i ranges from 2000 to 2004.
In the data 1,968 observations come from firms which sponsored all the races while ninety
six (96) observations are from firms which engaged in partial sponsorship. The results from
this regression are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
The coefficient on the dummy variable for partial sponsorship is positive and
statistically significant and indicates that firms which sponsor a team for some, but not all, of
the races in a season have excess returns 1.98 percentage points higher than those firms that
sponsor a car for the entire season. As expected, the coefficient for excess market returns is
positive and statistically significant. This outcome supports the market model that argues
that the returns on a security are linearly related to the returns on a market portfolio.
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We have included dummy variables for each year, omitting 2005, to control for any
year specific effects on return levels. With the exception of 2002 none of these dummy
variables are statistically significant.
These results suggest that firms who sponsor a car for less than a full season earn a
higher excess return than those firms who sponsor a car for the entire season. This suggests
that excess returns are a pre-cursor to a firm sponsoring a NASCAR car. This would lend
credence to the idea that firms that enter into race sponsorship agreements are in fact strong
firms relative to others in the market and that sponsorship may serve as a signal of a firm’s
financial health.
To test whether these results are affected by the racing season we also estimated the
model using a dummy variable for observations in the months of December and January
when there are no NASCAR races. 1 This dummy variable was not statistically significant
and its inclusion did not qualitatively change the coefficient estimates presented above.
Additionally we estimated a model containing a dummy variable indicating that the sponsors
car finished in the top five in points in the previous year. The coefficient on this dummy
variable was also not statistically significant.
V.

Conclusion

With this paper we hoped to answer three portfolio related questions. First, is it
possible to build a simple investment portfolio which will outperform established
benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis? Our analysis using relative and absolute risk
performance measures suggests the answer to this question is yes. The NASCAR portfolio
outperformed the S&P 500 in all periods using relative measures, and nine of twelve cases
using absolute measures.
Second, can the NASCAR portfolio diversify risk as effectively as a more broad
selection of stocks. Here our results were mixed. The NASCAR portfolio has a portfolio
beta of less than one and a lower standard deviation than the S&P 500 for the 2000-2005 and
the 2001-2005 time periods. For shorter time periods the portfolio beta is greater than one,
and the portfolio standard deviation is higher than that for the S&P 500.
These are important results as the equity which makes up our NASCAR portfolio was
not chosen based on careful financial analysis, but instead because of their participation in
race sponsorship. That a portfolio constructed in this way can lower risk beyond the market
benchmark over relatively short (three years and beyond) periods is a quite interesting
finding.
Finally, we wanted to know whether NASCAR sponsorship was a signal for excess
returns. Our results may also suggest that sponsorship serves as a signal of high performing
firms. This would suggest that firms that self-select into NASCAR sponsorship do so in part
1

In 2001 the season began on February 11 and continued to November 23.
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because of the potential gains in customer loyalty, but that these firms were likely already in
solid financial shape prior to entering into sponsorship agreements. As a result, higher risk
adjusted returns are not likely caused by sponsorship, but sponsorship signals firms that are
already likely to earn higher returns. The result that even brief sponsorship leads to excess
returns would lend credence to this view.
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Table 1:
Number of Public Companies as Primary Car Sponsors in Each Portfolio

Year
2000-2005
2001-2005
2002-2005
2003-2005
2004-2005
2005

Number
26
32
30
29
27
28

Table 2:
Risk and Return Measures: NASCAR Portfolio vs. S&P 500

Period

Compound Annual Return
NASCAR
S&P 500

Standard Deviation
NASCAR
S&P 500

NASCAR
Portfolio Beta

2000-2005

0.0793 *

-0.0268 **

0.370

0.372

0.826

2001-2005

0.0945 *

-0.0112**

0.330

0.333

0.878

2002-2005

0.1079 *

0.0211

0.300

0.270

1.015

2003-2005

0.1696 *

0.1237

0.218

0.158

1.281

2004-2005

0.0879

0.0595

0.145

0.105

1.212

0.0301

0.0300

0.124

0.078

1.475

2005

Note:
The * indicates that the difference between the NASCAR return and the S&P 500 return is statistically different from zero at
the 10% level (two-tailed) using annualized standard deviations.
The ** indicates that the difference between the NASCAR return and the S&P 500 return is statistically different from zero
at the 10% level (two-tailed) using normalized standard deviations.
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Table 3:
Risk-adjusted Return Measures, NASCAR Portfolio and S&P 500

Sharpe Ratio
Period

NASCAR

S&P 500

NASCAR

S&P 500

Jensen’s
Alpha
NASCAR

2000-2005

0.1413

-0.1448

0.0632

-0.0539

0.008007

0.040

2001-2005

0.2229

-0.0965

0.0837

-0.0321

0.008239

0.054

2002-2005

0.3008

0.0124

0.0888

0.0033

0.006976

0.058

2003-2005

0.6931

0.6665

0.1180

0.1053

0.001256*

0.040

2004-2005

0.4497

0.3527

0.0539

0.0370

0.001722*

0.033

2005

-0.0111

-0.0185

-0.0009

-0.0014

0.000302*

0.006

*

Treynor Ratio

New
Sharpe
NASCAR

Alphas not significantly different from zero for the periods 2003-2005, 2004-2005,2005
Table 4:
Regression Statistics for Excess Returns Model

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.397
R Square
0.157
Adjusted R Square
0.154
Standard Error
0.085
Observations
2,064
Table 5:
Regression Results for Excess Returns Model

Coefficients
-0.0003

Standard Error
0.0046

t Stat
-0.07

P-value
0.944

Partial Sponsor Dummy
Excess Market Returns

0.0198
0.8387

0.0093
0.0448

2.13
19.69

0.033
0.000

Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003

0.0070
0.0094
0.0131
0.0096

0.0068
0.0065
0.0066
0.0066

1.04
1.44
1.99
1.45

0.300
0.148
0.046
0.147

Year 2004

0.0058

0.0067

0.87

0.386

Intercept
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